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Embracing Change with All Four Arms: 
A Post-Humanist Defense of Genetic Engineering 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper sets out to defend human genetic engineering with a new bioethical 
approach, post-humanism, combined with a radical democratic political framework. 
Arguments for the restriction of human genetic engineering, and specifically germ-line 
enhancement, are reviewed. Arguments are divided into those which are fundamental 
matters of faith, or “bio-Luddite” arguments, and those which can be addressed through 
public policy, or “gene-angst” arguments.  
The four bio-Luddite concerns addressed are: Medicine Makes People Sick; There are 
Sacred Limits of the Natural Order; Technologies Always Serve Ruling Interests; The 
Genome is Too Complicated to Engineer. I argue that these are matters of faith that one 
either accepts or rejects, and that I reject. 
The non-fundamentalist or pragmatic concerns I discuss are: Fascist Applications; 
The Value of Genetic Diversity; The Geneticization of Life; Genetic Discrimination and 
Confidentiality; Systematically Bad Decisions by Parents; Discrimination Against the 
Disabled; Unequal Access; The Decline of Social Solidarity. I conclude that all these 
concerns can be adequately addressed through a proactive regulative framework 
administered by a liberal democratic state. Therefore, even germ-line genetic 
enhancement should eventually made available since the potential benefits greatly 
outweigh the potential risks. 
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Embracing Change with All Four Arms: 
A Post-Humanist Defense of Genetic Engineering 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nine years ago Jeremy Rifkin convinced me that genetic technology would determine 
the shape of the future while I rode a bus through the small, crooked, immaculate and 
beautiful streets of Kyoto. I was reading his Algeny [Rifkin, 1983), an alarmist attack on 
the coming of the gene age, alongside What Sort of People Should There Be? [Glover, 
1984), a moderate defense of genetic engineering by the Oxford don Jonathan Glover. In 
a sense, in the nine years since, I have recoiled from the radical Rifkin to embrace the 
reformist Glover. 
 
In earlier decades Rifkin had been an SDS activist and a founding member of the 
socialist New American Movement. Sometime in the early 80s, Rifkin saw the distant 
headlight of gene-technology and began to sound the alarm. Since then Rifkin and his 
Foundation on Economic Trends have led the fight against the release of genetically 
engineered organisms and the funding of genetics research, as well as other "trends" that 
Rifkin is worried about, such as the meat industry [Rifkin, 1992), the legal establishment 
of surrogate motherhood, and the speeding up of experienced time in the computer age 
[Rifkin, 1987). 
 
While extreme, Rifkin is a bellwether of Luddite tendencies in bioethics and the 
political Left, two of the movements within which I construct my worldview. Among 
bioethicists the anti-technological agenda has focused on abuses and social dangers in 
medical research and practice, and our alleged need to accept death and technological 
limits. The post-60s, environmentalist Left focuses on the ways that technology serves 
patriarchy, racism, imperialism, corporate profits, structural unemployment, the 
authoritarian state, and domination by scientific discourse. The response of bioethicists 
[Lappé, 1972, 1987; Kass, 1972, 1973, 1979; Ramsey, 1970. 1972, 1978; Duster, 1990; 
Council for Responsible Genetics on Human Germ-Line Manipulation, 1992) and the 
Left [Keller, 1991; Heins, 1991; Morales, 1991; Klein, 1991; Miringoff, 1991; and 
Hubbard and Wald, 1993a, 1993b) to genetic engineering has been particularly fevered, 
driven by accusations of eugenics and the defilement of sacred boundaries. 
 
Since that bus ride in Kyoto my initial horrified agreement with Rifkin has shifted to 
determined agreement with Glover, that we can control genetic technology and make it a 
boon rather than a bane. Instead of a Brave New World, I see genetic engineering offering 
a grand, albeit somewhat unpredictable, future. While many of the concerns of ethicists 
and the Left about this technology are well-founded, I now believe they are answerable. 
While I still acknowledge the need for democratic control and social limits, I am now 
convinced that banning genetic engineering would be a profound mistake.  
 
Those who set aside angst about changing human nature, and embrace the possibility 
of rapid diversification of types of life, are establishing a new moral and political 
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philosophy for the 21st century, a system some refer to as "post-humanism." The term 
“post-humanism” was coined by cyberpunk theorist Bruce Sterling in his 1985 novel 
Schismatrix, and popularized by a loose network of anarchocapitalist technology 
enthusiasts who refer to themselves as "extropians" [More, 1990, 1992, 1994). On the 
Left, the principal touchpoint for post-humanism has been Donna Haraway, starting with 
her delphic 1985 "Manifesto for Cyborgs."  
 
Like all philosophical systems, post-humanism incorporates prior philosophic and 
political systems but recasts them around new definitions of personhood, citizenship, and 
the limits of social solidarity and human knowledge. Like Glover, post-humanists view 
the coming of genetic technology the way most Americans now view organ transplants or 
chemotherapy; there are many practical questions about how the technologies get 
developed and tested, who needs them, and how we pay for them, but there is no question 
that they should be available.  
 
Unfortunately most post-humanists are unalloyed libertarians and anarchists, and offer 
no answers to concerns about the way that social inequality will shape, and beshaped by, 
genetic technology. In this essay I will be trying to imagine what our current liberal 
democratic societies could be like if we allowed a post-humanist flowering of genetic 
technology, and how many of the alleged problems of genetic engineering can be 
addressed through radicalizing both democracy and liberty, rather than by erasing the 
State or imposing Luddite bans.  
 
2. Distinctions without a Difference 
 
Many writers on these technologies draw distinctions between "negative" and 
"positive" genetic modification, and the modification of the somatic versus germ-line 
cells [Glover, 1984; Krimsky, 1990; Moseley, 1991; Elias and Annas, 1992; UNESCO 
International Bioethics Committee, 1995). Negative genetic modification has been 
defined as the correction of a genetic disease, while positive modification has been 
defined as the attempt to enhance human ability beyond its normal limits. The somatic-
germ-line distinction has been made to address the alleged ethical difference in modifying 
only one's own body, versus modifying one's progeny as well.  
 
Both distinctions have been made by those who wanted to draw a line to demarcate 
the ethical boundaries of genetic research. The distinctions are quite fuzzy, however 
[Krimsky, 1990; Bonnicksen, 1994A). Take for instance Culver and Gert's effort to define 
"malady" to distinguish when a genetic therapy is or isn't "enhancement": 
 
A person has a malady if and only if he has  a condition, other than his rational beliefs and 
desires, such that he is suffering, or at increased risk of suffering, an evil (death, pain, 
disability, loss of freedom or opportunity or loss of pleasure) in the absence of distinct 
sustaining cause. [Culver and Gert, 1982: 125) 
 
Doesn't any cause of illness, suffering and death, or inadequacy in the face of one's goals, 
fit this criteria? Take for instance a potential future genetic therapy that turned off a 
hypothetical aging switch, doubling the human life span; is this therapy for the diseases 
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which result from the activation of the aging switch, such as Alzheimer’s or cancer, or an 
unconscionable intervention into the natural span of life? 
 
As to the modification of one's own genes versus future progeny, the argument is 
made that current generations would be violating the self-determination of future 
generations by doing so. The first response is that our choice of breeding partners already 
"determines" the biology of future generations. Take the case of a couple who both carry 
a gene for latent inheritable mental illness. The only difference between their choosing 
not to breed with one another, and choosing to have germ-line therapy on themselves or 
their child to correct the illness, is that the latter choice is a far happier one.   
 
Technology itself makes the distinction unhelpful, since some viral vectors will 
introduce DNA into both somatic and germ-line cells, and some disorders will require 
intervention at the blastula stage or before conception in order to be effectively treated. 
Genetic technology will make it possible for future generations to change their genes back 
if they don't like them. Only modifications which remove decision-making autonomy 
from future generations altogether would truly raise issues of "self-determination," and I 
will discuss such fascist scenarios below.  
 
These distinctions are extremely fuzzy, and do not represent important ethical 
boundaries. In this essay I want to defend genetic therapy and enhancement, as well as 
self-modification by competent adults and our modification of our progeny. Most 
international consensus statements have drawn the line at germ-line therapy, or genetic 
enhancement, or at least germ-line enhancement [Bonnicksen, 1994A) although language 
about these matters are conspicuously absent in two recent statements [UNESCO 
International Bioethics Committee, 1995; HUGO, 1995). 
 
Therefore, the center of the terrain that I want to defend is germ-line enhancement, the 
modification of the genetic code such that the parent passes on the enhancements to their 
progeny.  The defense of this practice necessarily addresses the concerns about many 
other technologies, such as: 
 
In-Vitro Fertilization 
Surrogate Mothering 
Extra-uterine Gestation 
Genetic Screening and Diagnosis 
Genetic Selection, including Sex Selection 
Cloning of Embryos 
 
In a more fundamental sense I am writing in defense of our control of our bodies, 
individually and collectively. I want to build a broad enough defense to cover any 
technology offering modification of human abilities, whether a specific genetic 
application has been imagined for that purpose or not. 
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3. Ethical Starting Points for A Defense 
 
A. Rule Utilitarianism   
 
In general I assume the ethical stance of Millsian rule utilitarianism:  acts are ethical 
which lead to the greatest good or happiness for the greatest number. Rule utilitarianism 
means that, when confronted with a distasteful case, such as throwing a Christian to a lion 
for the amusement of thousands of Romans, I fall back on general rules of thumb: "In 
general, societies that respect individual rights and liberties will lead to greater happiness 
for all."  
 
In the case of genetic engineering my broad assertion is that gene-technologies can, 
and probably will, give people longer, healthier lives, with more choices and greater 
happiness. In fact, these technologies offer the possibility that we will be able to 
experience utilities greater and more intense than those on our current mental pallet. 
Genetic technology will bring advances in pharmaceuticals and the therapeutic treatment 
of disease, ameliorating many illnesses and forms of suffering. Somewhat further in the 
future, our sense organs themselves may be re-engineered to allow us to perceive greater 
ranges of light and sound, our bodies re-engineered to permit us to engage in more 
strenuous activities, and our minds re-engineered to permit us to think more profound and 
intense thoughts. If utility is an ethical goal, direct control of our body and mind, through 
genetic control, cybernetics, prosthetics, or whatever, suggests the possibility of unlimited 
utility, and thus an immeasurable good. 
 
 
B. Privacy, Self-Determination and Bodily Autonomy   
 
But there are other rules to consider, rules which are the basis of other ethical 
systems. Most utilitarians, and many others, accept the general rule that liberal societies, 
which allow maximum self-determination, will maximize social utility. The rule of, or 
right to, self-determination also argues that society should have very good reasons before 
interfering with competent adults applying genetic technology to themselves and their 
property. Self-determining people should be allowed the privacy to do what they want to 
with their bodies, and the conceptive products of their bodies, except when they are not 
competent, or their actions will cause great harm to others. I will argue that most concerns 
about human genetic engineering do not amount to a clear and present danger to the 
public safety adequate to legitimate violating bodily autonomy and personal liberty. My 
objection to state intervention in personal liberty holds especially true for moral appeals 
to defend “human nature,” “public morality,” and so on, such as the language of many 
consensus statements which argue against genetic technology alleging defense of “human 
dignity.” 
 
Acknowledging self-determination as an ethical starting point addresses half of the 
revulsion to genetic engineering: the concern that people will be forced to conform to 
eugenic policies. I will discuss this fear of racist and authoritarian regimes at greater 
length, but suffice it to say here that individuals should not be forced to have or abort 
children, or forced to modify their own or their children's genetic code. I heartily endorse 
the formulation of the Preliminary Draft of a Universal Declaration on the Human 
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Genome and Human Rights [UNESCO International Bioethics Committee, 1995) which 
states that 
 
7. No intervention affecting an individual's genome may be undertaken, whether for 
scientific, therapeutic or diagnostic purposes, ... without prior, free and informed consent 
of the person concerned or, where appropriate, of his or her duly authorized 
representatives, guided by the person's best interests. 
 
 In this essay, I am articulating the genetics policies that liberal and democratic societies 
should adopt; I am opposed to racism and authoritarianism, and any racist or authoritarian 
application of genetic technology. 
 
I also view the embryo and fetus as the biological property of the parents, and 
exclusively of the mother when in utero.  Again, the rights of the future child and of 
society may restrict what we allow parents to do to their prenatal property. But I would 
again argue that the risks to society and to the children themselves of prenatal genetic 
manipulation are negligible for the near future, and regulable as they become apparent.   
 
 
C. Freedom from Biological Necessity   
 
Genetic technology promises freedom and self-determination at an even more basic 
level: freedom from biological necessity. Social domination pales before our domination 
by the inevitability of birth, illness, aging and death, burdens that genetic technology 
offers to ameliorate. As for Marx, the goal of this revolution is to move from the realm of 
necessity to the realm of freedom. Just like industrial automation, genetic technology is a 
technology with liberatory possibilities; the difficulties lie not in the means of production, 
but in the relations of production, the social and political context in which the technology 
is deployed. 
 
A second, and far less Marxian observation, is that social domination has some  
biological determinants. Patriarchy is, in part, based on women's physical vulnerability, 
and their special role in reproduction. While industrialization, contraception and the 
liberal democratic state may have removed the bulk of patriarchy's weight, genetic 
technology offers to remove the rest. Similarly, while racism, ageism, heterosexism, and 
so on may be only 10% biological and 90% social construction, at least the biological 
factors can be made a matter of choice by genetic and biological technology. 
 
 
D. Justice and a Better Society  
 
While the biological factors in most forms of inequality are probably slight, genetic 
technology does promise to create a more equal society in a very basic way: by 
eliminating congenital sources of illness and disability that create the most intractable 
forms of inequality in society. We can go to great lengths to give the ill and disabled full 
access to society, but their disabilities place basic limits on how equal their social 
participation and power can be. Our ability to ameliorate these sources of congenital 
inequality may even impose obligations on us to do so, at least for those who are 
cognitively impaired and incompetent. Admittedly, we will probably have surmounted 
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most disabilities through non-genetic technological fixes long before we do so through 
genetic therapy. But the general principle is that genetic technology promises to make it 
possible to give all citizens the physical and cognitive abilities for equal participation, and 
perhaps even to bring about a general enhancement of the abilities essential to 
empowered citizenship. 
 
E. A Critical Defense 
 
Unlike those libertarians who hold self-determination as a cardinal principle, I adopt 
more of a social democratic stance, and foresee legitimate limits that we can and should 
place on these technologies. For instance, some characteristics of society, such as social 
solidarity and general equality, are so important that they warrant the regulation of these 
technologies in the furtherance of these goals.  Collective interests should also be pursued 
through active means, such as government subsidies for the research, development and 
application of genetic technologies.  
 
Nor am I an unquestioning advocate of technological progress. Some technologies are 
so inscribed with harmful ends that no amount of regulation and social direction can 
make them worth the risk [Winner, 1986). If I were convinced that genetic technology, 
like nuclear weapons technology, had no redeeming qualities and only great risks, then I 
would embrace a complete ban.  
 
But the potential benefits of genetic technology far outweigh the potential risks. In 
short, I advocate a position of critical support, a position which reflects the suspicious 
optimism that most people around the world have toward genetic technology. 
 
A 1987 survey of Americans by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment found that 
support for genetic engineering ranged from 84% approval for genetic modifications to 
"Stop children from inheriting a usually fatal genetic disease," to 44% support for 
"positive" genetic modification to "Improve the intelligence level and physical 
characteristics that children would inherit." [OTA, 1987) In a 1993 survey, more than 
50% of the respondents in India and Thailand supported the use of gene therapy for the 
purposes of physical, intellectual or moral enhancement [Macer, 1994). A 1994 Gallup 
poll in the UK reports 20% of people accepting enhancement gene therapy [Nature [1994) 
371: 193]. 
 
 
4. Arguments Against Genetic Technology 
 
There are at least two kinds of criticisms of genetic technology, fundamentalist and 
non-fundamentalist. (See Mauron and Thevox [Mauron and Thevox, 1991]) for a similar 
distinction.) The fundamentalist or “bio-Luddite” concerns,  such as those of Jeremy 
Rifkin, I reject fundamentally. On the other hand, I accept the validity of many of the non-
fundamental concerns, but see the problems they suggest as soluble. Few of these 
concerns about genetic technology raise new questions for medical ethics [Proctor, 1993).  
The same questions have been raised by previous medical research and therapy, and those 
challenges have been met without bans on those technologies.  
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Some non-fundamentalist critics believe that, cumulatively, the risks posed by new 
genetic technologies are great enough to warrant postponing genetic research for some 
indefinite period of study and preparation. With these concerns I will argue that, with 
adequate technology assessment and anticipatory regulation, there will be adequate time 
to regulate genetic technology as we proceed; none of the risks are sufficiently weighty, 
individually or cumulatively, to outweigh the potential benefits. 
 
The fundamentalist or bio-Luddite concerns I will address are: 
 
A. Bio-Luddism 1 : Medicine Makes People Sick 
B. Bio-Luddism 2 : Sacred Limits of the Natural Order 
C. Bio-Luddism 3 : Technologies Serve Ruling Interests 
D. Bio-Luddism 4 : The Genome is Too Complicated to Engineer 
 
The non-fundamentalist or pragmatic concerns I will discuss are: 
 
E. Gene Angst 1 : Fascist Applications 
F. Gene Angst 2 : The Value of Genetic Diversity 
G. Gene Angst 3 : The Geneticization of Life 
H. Gene Angst 4 : Genetic Discrimination and Confidentiality 
I. Gene Angst 5 : Systematically Bad Decisions by Parents for Children 
J. Gene Angst 6 : Discrimination Against the Disabled 
K. Gene Angst 7 : Unequal Access, Priority Setting and the Market 
L. Gene Angst 8 : The Decline of Social Solidarity 
 
 
Bio-Luddism 1 : Medicine Makes People Sick 
 
One extreme bio-Luddite position was elaborated by Ivan Illich [Illich, 1975): 
medicine itself makes us sick and should be done away with.  A variant on this argument 
is that genetic screening will eventually determine that all of us are "at risk," making 
everyone see themselves as sick. More troubling, genetic diagnosis might create a two-
tier social system, divided between those with relatively clean genes and those with 
genetic disease. In other words, genetic diagnosis will make us all genetically diseased.  
This would be even more problematic if the genetic diagnosis was for a disease which 
was not yet curable.  
 
Some medicine makes some people sicker, but I hold fast to the modernist promise 
that scientific progress generally improves our lives and that knowledge is better than 
ignorance. It is unlikely that we will ever force people to know their likelihood of 
developing disease, though perhaps we should educate parents and physicians to be 
cautious about informing children of their risks. In any case, we all know that we are at 
risk of dying, and with or without genetic diagnosis people view the medical history of 
their parents and relatives as harbingers of things to come. Both knowing and refusing to 
know one's genetic makeup are empowering choices for competent adults; denying 
people the option of making this choice does not improve their lives. 
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This argument also presumes just the first, screening phase of the new eugenics, and 
not the latter correction phase. Far from making everyone sick, the advance of genetic 
therapy promises to make everyone well. 
 
 
Bio-Luddism 2 : Sacred Limits of the Natural Order 
 
Rifkin has joined forces with religious leaders to assert another fundamentalist tenet, 
that genetic engineering transgresses sacred limits beyond which we should not "play 
God" [Porter, 1990). I don't believe that divine limits are discernible, and I don't believe 
in any "natural order" except the one we've got. As Love and Rockets point out: "you 
can't go against nature, 'cause when you go against nature, its part of nature too." There 
are no "natural limits" in our taking control of our biology or ecology. There is no 
"natural" way to have a baby or die. Even if there was a natural way to birth, age or die, I 
don't believe we are morally compelled to adopt it. 
 
It may be that this idea of a divinely ordained biological order is distinctly Judeo-
Christian-Islamic, and not shared by religions and cultures which believe in different 
cosmogonies. In a 1993 survey of attitudes towards genetic therapy in the Asia-Pacific 
region (Australia, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, The Philippines, 
Russia, Singapore and Thailand) Daryl Macer reports that there was overwhelming 
support for genetic therapy to cure disease, and that almost no respondents were 
concerned that the therapy violated the natural order or God’s plan [Macer, 1994). 
 
Bio-Luddism 3 : Technologies Serve Ruling Interests 
 
Some hesitate to argue that medical technology is bad in and of itself, but argue 
instead that the powerful always shape and apply technologies to further their domination 
of the less powerful  [Hubbard and Wald, 1993]. While this is probably true, the 
conclusion is that all technology should be abandoned. The wealthy and powerful have 
more access to telephones than the poor and powerless, and telephones are used by the 
wealthy and powerful to collect more wealth and power. But I see the answer to be 
subsidized phone service and egalitarian social reform, not banning the telephone 
[Winner, 1986].  
 
 
Bio-Luddism 4 : The Genome is Too Complicated to Engineer 
 
A fourth fundamentalist conviction is that the genome is too complicated to engineer, 
and therefore there are certain to be unpleasant, unintended consequences [Glover, 1984: 
33). This argument is directly parallel to the deep ecologists’ conclusion that human 
management of the complex global eco-system is impossible, and that our only hope is to 
leave the planet alone to its own self-organization. Arne Naess [Naess, 1973) and Devall 
and Sessions [Sessions, 1980) are the modern touchstones for the deep ecological 
philosophy which overlaps with this biofundamentalist stupefaction in the face of evolved 
complexity, while movements like Earth First! take the argument to its reductio ad 
absurdum (AIDS is good, etc.). Outside of the anti-environmental Right, voices in 
defense of the possibility of eco-management have been rare [Anderson, 1987). 
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The genome and eco-system are both very complicated, and the ability to do more 
than correct local defects in either may be many decades away. But eventually we will 
have the capacity to write genetic code and re-engineer eco-systems, and to computer-
model the structural consequences of our interventions on future bodies and planets. Of 
course, it will be difficult to decide when the consequences of a genetic blueprint are 
sufficiently well-understood that it is safe for use, and our current regulatory scheme is 
probably not yet adequate to the task [Zallen, 1989; Ledley, et al., 1992; Ledley, 1991; 
Areen and King, 1990; Council for Responsible Genetics, 1993).   
 
Our understanding of the genome and ability to predict consequences must be very 
robust before we allow human applications or the release of animal applications. While 
Elias and Annas [Elias and Naess, 1992) object to "positive" germ-line therapy, which I 
would defend, they propose two sensible preconditions on the application of gene-
engineering: 
 
(a) that there should be considerable prior experience with human somatic cell gene 
therapy, which has clearly established its safety and efficacy; and  
 
(b) that there should be reasonable scientific evidence using appropriate animal models 
that germ-line gene therapy will cure or prevent the disease in question and not cause any 
harm, and 
 
(c) all applications should be approved by the NIH's Working Group on Gene Therapy 
and local Institutional Review Boards, with prior public discussion. 
 
Again. I also endorse the formulation of the Preliminary Draft of a Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights [UNESCO International Bioethics Committee, 
1995) which states that 
 
7. No intervention affecting an individual's genome may be undertaken, whether for 
scientific, therapeutic or diagnostic purposes, without rigorous and prior assessment of 
risks and benefits pertaining thereto... 
 
Those of us who believe in the possibility of effective public regulation may differ widely 
as to the appropriate standards the public and these regulatory bodies may use. But 
liberals and conservatives differ fundamentally from those bio-Luddites who believe that 
the natural world is so complicated, and governments so unwise, that all intervention 
must be forbidden. 
 
Undoubtedly, genetic design will undergo extensive experimentation in the design of 
animals before any human experimentation begins, and I see few ethical problems with 
using animals for experiments in genetic design. The problem with animal research is that  
it might produce species that are dangerous if released into the eco-system. Release of 
gene-engineered creatures should be done very cautiously, and it may be that we should 
have a moratoria on the release of genetically engineered plants and animals until we 
have adequate oversight [Council for Responsible Genetics, 1993). Genengineered micro-
organisms are a much greater risk than genengineered humans, since humans don’t breed 
rapidly, are completely vulnerable for years of childhood, are large and visible, and can be 
controlled with firearms.  
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The next step will be to decide when genetic products can be applied by adults to 
themselves, for therapeutic or other reasons.  It is possible to imagine social risks from 
self-applied genetic modification, and we would probably require genetic products to go 
through the same Food and Drug Administration testing that pharmaceuticals go through. 
On the other hand, I am in favor of substantial liberalization of our drug and 
pharmaceutical regulations, including the legalization of narcotics and psychotropic 
drugs, and I am also for a fairly liberal policy towards genetic self-modification. 
 
The real dilemma with testing comes with the genetic design of children [Fletcher, 
1985). Even if we had an extreme market society which permitted unregulated genetic 
modification of eggs, sperm and embryos, I suspect that few women would risk bearing 
and raising children whose "product safety" had not been guaranteed. Nonetheless we will 
inevitably continue to strictly regulate the genetic modification of children. The safety 
and efficacy of genetic products will not only be demanded by parents, but also by federal 
agencies and providers.  
 
While daunting, these are many of the same issues raised by drugs and medical 
devices today. With or without genetic design products we are moving to a new phase of 
technological assessment of medical products balancing the demands for demonstrated 
efficacy and safety with demands for rapid release of useful therapies, and the individual 
freedom to control one's body. Genetic products will be only one of the ultimately soluble 
challenges our regulatory scheme will face. 
 
 
 
Gene Angst 1 : Fascist Applications 
 
Another concern expressed by many critics of genetic technology is the dire 
consequences of the re-emergence of fascist, racist and authoritarian regimes, and their 
use of genengineering to produce compliant, genetically uniform subjects. The first point 
to make about fascist uses of eugenic ideology or technology is that nothing a democratic 
society does to forbid itself genetic technology will have any impact on future or 
contemporary fascist regimes. Indeed, if there is any "national security" to be gained from 
genetic technology then it would behoove liberal democracies to gain them as well. For 
instance, public health campaigns to detect and correct the genetic predisposition to 
alcoholism, or to enhance the intelligence of children, could make nations much more 
powerful and productive than their more conservative neighbors; would it not be in the 
interest of democracy itself for democracies to pursue these measures? 
 
Yet, what if the fascist regimes found strength in breeding different castes a la Brave 
New World, and democracies could only meet the challenge by becoming equally 
repugnant? This is a possibility, and it raises the important point: the way to stop fascist 
uses of genetics is to prevent the rise of fascism, not to restrict the emergence of genetic 
technology. As we see today with Iraq and North Korea, firm agreements by right-
thinking nations that only the United States is sufficiently moral to be allowed the 
ownership of nuclear and chemical weapons has little impact on recalcitrant regimes. If 
we cannot effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology, with its large 
radioactive facilities visible to satellites, we will have even less success with genetic 
laboratories. I support the strengthening of the legal, judicial and military might of U.N. 
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so that it might begin to enforce global law, but I think the proper task for such a New 
World Order is the suppression of fascist regimes likely to use genetics for nefarious 
ends, not the policing and suppression of outlawed genetic technologies. Bonnicksen 
[Bonnicksen, 1994A) has written a very complete review of the global efforts to 
harmonize national policies towards genetics; the responses to her piece [Cook-Deegan, 
1994; Blank, 1994; Chadwick, 1994; Fletcher, 1994; Knoppers and Bris, 1994; Mauron, 
1994; Shapiro, 1994; Wertz, 1994; Winston, 1994; Byk, 1994; Kielsten, 1994; Macer, 
1994; Bonnicksen, 1994B) are also fascinating in that they generally suggest a softening 
of the bioethics community toward germ-line therapy, if not enhancement. 
 
Genetic science does not itself encourage racism or authoritarianism. In fact, the 
advance of scientific knowledge may even erode the pseudo-scientific basis on which 
most eugenics has rested. Presumably the advance of genetic science will tell us whether 
there is a genetic basis for gender and racial differences in abilities, or not, and how 
important these are. If there are genetic factors in gender or racial difference, they will 
most likely be revealed as minor beside the social factors, and the genetic factors will 
become ameliorable through a technical fix. Some insist that knowledge itself, or 
knowledge about forbidden topics, will lead to fascism; I prefer the modernist optimism 
that knowledge is at least neutral towards, and sometimes a scourge of, obscurantism. 
 
 
Gene Angst 2 : The Value of Genetic Diversity 
 
Another concern that is often expressed vis-à-vis genetic engineering is the alleged 
aesthetic or biological virtues of genetic diversity. Many refer to the evidence from 
ecology that ecosystems are more stable when they contain a greater diversity of gene-
lines. Some suggest, for instance, that our very survival as a species might hinge on 
genetic diversity if we faced some blight that only a few were resistant to.  
 
The first objection to this argument is that diversity is not a sufficiently compelling 
ethical or aesthetic virtue that it can trump the prevention of disease, or the improvement 
of the quality of our lives. We "reduced diversity" when we eradicated smallpox and 
polio, with no regrets. We "reduce diversity" when we insist on compulsory education 
because we don't value the diversity of extreme class inequality.  
 
The second objection to the diversity argument is that any loss of adaptiveness 
through biological diversity will be compensated for by an increase in biological 
knowledge and control. It is unlikely that a future society would have the ability to create 
"superior genes" and yet be unable to meet the challenge of infectious disease.  
 
Third, the regime of genetics I have outlined is a liberal one, which should produce as 
much diversity as it reduces. While I support public provision of genetic screening for 
disease, I oppose any eugenic coercion. People desire different attributes and abilities, for 
themselves and their children; for every Aryan parent that chooses a blond, blue-eyed 
Barbie phenotype, I expect there would be a Chinese parent choosing a classic Chinese 
ideal of beauty. True, this might lead to the convergence toward a few physical and 
mental ideals, though I suspect that phenotypic fashions will change quickly.  But I see no 
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ethical difference between permitting people to change their genes in conformity with 
social fashions, and permitting them to change their clothes, makeup and beliefs to do so. 
 
Perhaps there is some aesthetic or civic virtue in phenotypic diversity. If it is valued 
by the public, let us establish incentives for diversity. If the number of parents choosing 
to raise blond boys is offensive to public opinion, we can give tax incentives for parents 
who bear dark-haired girls. In any case, we will quickly know if there are broad trends 
that we find offensive, and I trust our ability to craft non-coercive policy responses to re-
establish any valued diversity we feel may be eroding. 
 
 
Gene Angst 3 : The Geneticization of Life 
 
A more diffuse "cultural" concern about genetic technology is that people will begin 
to see genetics as more central and influential in life than they should. For instance, 
Richard Shweder [Shweder, 1994) believes that eugenics and genetic determinism are 
being fueled by contemporary genetic technology and research, at the expense of attempts 
to ameliorate social ills. Other critics, such as Barbara Katz Rothman [Rothman, 1989), 
see genetic technology as contributing to the reification of the genetic ties between people 
at the expense of valuing their social relationships. 
 
Both of these concerns have some legitimacy. Undoubtedly the public will invest 
genetics with more importance in the production of disease, intelligence and other 
characteristics than will be warranted by a more balanced scientific perspective. And as 
the current market for in vitro fertilization shows, people will pay astronomic sums for 
the chance at a genetic tie to their children, when they would have otherwise had to adapt 
to adoption in an earlier age.  
 
Is the misapprehension of genetic influence, and disproportionate concern with 
genetic ties made more or less likely by the advance of genetic technology? When we 
begin screening for the genes which make lung cancer more likely, it won't take long for 
the "negatives" to understand that they are still at risk from smoking or asbestos. As 
genetic diagnosis and treatment become more prevalent people will become as 
sophisticated about their genetic diagnoses as they are about the risks of cigarette 
smoking or cholesterol: risk-averse folks will take their genetic propensities very 
seriously, and risk-prone folks won't. If they lack an OB gene, and yet get fat, they will 
redouble their dieting.  
 
Parents will probably be less gene-obsessed when they can either have a child with all 
their parents’ genetic flaws, or one that shares their facial features, but has been tweaked 
with someone else’s good teeth, arched feet, height, and intelligence. It will considered 
obsessive and dumb to give your kids only parental genes, and parenting will be the 
definition of parental ties, not parentage. 
 
As to Rothman's concern over the primacy of social ties, fertility treatments, 
surrogacy and genetic technology do not reify the genetic bond, but cause its slow 
deconstruction [Macklin, 1991; Stanworth, 1988). Just as heart-lung machines forced us 
to confront the separability of heart and brain death, genetic intervention will force us to 
clarify the relationship of social ties and genetic ties. If you've picked most of your child's 
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genes from a catalog, its likely to reinforce the importance of your social parenting ties to 
your children. 
 
Our ability to control genetics will help to clarify the appropriate weight to give to 
genetics in culture and social affairs. As the nature-nurture relationship becomes clarified, 
people will not be any less likely, probably more likely, to fix the nurture side of their 
problems. What if some future polity determined that it would be easier to genetically 
engineer resistance to smog than to clean up industrial air pollution? It would be a 
tragedy, but not really that different from our struggles over toxics today, which we 
compensate for through health care expenditures. Genetic technology won't make it any 
less likely that we will have an ecologically sane, healthy or equal society, only that our 
fall-back options will be more effective.  
 
 
Gene Angst 4 : Genetic Discrimination and Confidentiality 
 
Many opponents of genetic investigation are concerned that growing genetic 
knowledge will lead to discrimination against the “genetically diseased and disabled.” 
Some assert that genetic therapy itself will increase this discrimination by bringing 
intense pressure to bear on those with genetic diseases to have the disease corrected, and 
not burden society and future generations with their diseases. 
 
It is certainly true that employers are already attempting to discover the genetic risks 
of their employees, and deny employment or health insurance on the basis of this risk 
profile. A bill guaranteeing the confidentiality of genetic information has been introduced 
in the U.S. Congress, and while it has not yet passed, some form of confidentiality is 
certain to be guaranteed by the turn of the millennium. In addition, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and similar legislation in the U.S. will clearly be mustered to defend 
workers from genetic discrimination. The U.S. Human Genome Project's Task Force on 
Genetic Information and Insurance has recommended that genetic screening be 
accompanied by universal access to insurance, and that genetic screening not be used to 
deny insurance [Murray, 1993). Internationally, there is also a consensus on these 
reforms, expressed for instance in the Preliminary Draft of a Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights [UNESCO International Bioethics Committee. 1995) 
which states that  
8. No one may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics and 
that aims or has the effect of injuring the recognition of human dignity or the enjoyment 
of his or her rights on the grounds of equality.  
 
9. The confidentiality of genetic data associated with a named person and stored or 
processed for the purposes of research or any other purpose, must be protected from third 
parties.  
 
Keeping genetic information confidential from insurers and other non-medical 
personnel in the health care system is trickier, since the records will show any special 
screening or treatment that genetic risks called for. Unregulated, the use of genetic risk 
information could greatly strengthen the ability of insurers to exclude the illness-prone 
from their risk pools, or charge them premiums equivalent to the costs of their potential 
treatments. Again however, popular insurance reform legislation before the U.S. 
Congress will ban "risk-rating" and excluding clients with "pre-existing conditions." 
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These two reforms will likely reduce the number of insurance companies in the country 
by half or more, and make genetic discrimination in health insurance a more or less moot 
point. Some have suggested further that the pervasiveness of genetic information will 
make private health insurance impossible; to which I say, good riddance. 
 
There are undoubtedly many other nefarious uses to which knowledge of someone's 
genetic make-up can be put. But genetic information is only one small category of the 
information about our lives which is potentially in the public domain, and potentially 
injurious. The regulation of genetic technology really has very little to do with whether 
we establish data privacy in the 21st century. 
 
 
Gene Angst 5 : Systematically Bad Decisions by Parents for Children 
 
The right to a "custom-made child" is merely the natural extension of our current 
discourse of reproductive rights.  I see no virtue in the role of chance in conception, and 
great virtue in expanding choice. To reiterate my starting points, embryos and fetuses are 
biological property and parents should be allowed to modify or terminate them as they see 
fit, within broad social constraints. If women are to be allowed the "reproductive right" or 
"choice" to choose the father of their child, with his attendant characteristics, then they 
should be allowed the right to choose the characteristics from a catalog.  
 
What then are the broad social limits to be placed on parents genetic decisions? It is 
obvious that our polity can and should place limits on the genetic decisions parents make. 
Glover [Glover, 1984) asks,  for instance, what if a religious minority were to engineer a 
sign of their faith on their children's foreheads, and engineer their brains to be incapable 
of reading in order to prevent apostasy? Certainly I would accept an intervention against 
parents who wanted to systematically deprive their children of abilities, though I am not 
so certain about the religious symbol. 
 
Or take the case of sex selection, which has been a very sore point for pro-choice 
bioethics. While we may find gender-biased parents distasteful, it clearly preferable that 
parents have wanted children rather than unwanted children, and it is their right to decide 
what they want. It should also be a goal of public policy to discourage infanticide, even if 
the result is an increase in abortions, and to make abortion unnecessary by increasingly 
the availability of preconceptual choice. Potential women are not women, and so they 
have no standing in a claim that parental preferences violate their rights. 
 
Sex selection becomes a matter of public concern if parents' decisions cumulate to 
undesirable outcomes, such as sex imbalanced populations. There is ample evidence that 
prenatal diagnosis in China and India [Kusum, 1993) leads to almost exclusive abortion 
of female fetuses. It still isn't obvious to me what the problem is with sex imbalance in 
the population. The supposition that fewer women in the next generation reduces the 
power of women as a demographic group may be true, though rather simplistic, and not 
yet a compelling reason for taking away the reproductive liberty of this generation of 
women.  Fewer women will reduce the population growth rate, which is probably a 
welcome outcome, though two sexes will soon be as unnecessary for reproduction as they 
are for parenting. Men may find it harder to find brides, and be forced to consider the 
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virtues of celibacy, masturbation, polygyny and homosexuality, which again should be no 
concern of the State.  
 
In any case, if there was a public gnashing of teeth and tearing of hair at the emerging 
sex imbalance in baby population, we’d have several years to think about policy 
responses.  As I suggested above, my preference would be financial incentives to pursue 
other choices, rather than coercion. The point is that we would have ample opportunity to 
confront these challenges as we proceed, and need not impose hasty preemptive bans. 
 
 
Gene Angst 6 : Discrimination Against the Disabled 
 
Opponents of sex selection and of eugenic efforts against genetic disease argue that 
these decisions are acts of prejudice against women and the disabled, and perpetuate the 
second class status of women and the disabled by focusing on genetic rather than social 
amelioration. In the first place, embryos and fetuses are not persons, and therefore their 
rights cannot be violated as persons or as members of oppressed social groups. While 
parents may make reproductive decisions for many reasons we disapprove of, such as 
aborting a fetus because the father was accidentally of the "wrong" race, this is not a 
reason to intervene.  
 
The alleged link between choosing to abort a disabled child, or correcting their 
disability through genetic therapy, and the perpetuation of oppression of the disabled 
seems tenuous at best. Perhaps by reducing the population of disabled we reduce their 
power at the ballot box. But a parent's moral obligation to give their children the greatest 
quality of life, and the fullest range of abilities, includes not only the obligation to treat a 
disabled child with respect and love, but also the obligation to keep them from having 
disabilities in the first place. It also seems likely that a society with fewer disabled would 
increase rather than decrease their per capita expenditures on the disabled. 
 
 
Gene Angst 7 : Unequal Access, Priority Setting and the Market 
 
As a social democrat, one of my gravest concerns is  how social inequality will 
constrain access to genetic technology, and how genetic technology may reinforce social 
inequality. Establishing the appropriate balance of state and market in genetics starts with 
the creation of a national health budget, most likely through the creation of a national 
health system, such as the Clinton plan or some other form of national health insurance. 
Such a system allows the ethical determination of utility trade-offs, from what the level of 
health care expenditures should be, to what should be included in the basic package of 
guaranteed medical services and what should be consigned to the private medical market. 
I believe the Oregon experiment in public, accountable, utility-theory-based rationing is 
the model for this kind of priority allocation. The Clinton administration’s plan for health 
care reform would also have established a minimum universal package of health benefits, 
and permitted plans to compete onthe basis of additional services. 
 
If we had such a system, I don’t think most fertility treatments would make the cut 
into the minimum universal package. Future positive genetic "enhancements" would not 
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be included until safety, efficacy and voluntariness was adequately assured. On the other 
hand,  genetic screening and corrective genetic therapy would clearly be socially 
acceptable, cost-effective, and therefore a plausible positive right. This leaves me in a 
quandary – I want reproductive technologies and genetic therapies to be legal and 
available to all who want them regardless of income, but I'm not prepared to argue that 
they are a positive right worthy of public subsidy. Yet, if gene products are left in the 
market, only the wealthy will have access to them, with the upper-classes having more 
life opportunities and potentially becoming genetically healthier and more intelligent than 
the poor, which is unethical in an equal opportunity society [Daniels, 1986). 
 
These problems are really a sub-category of the larger task of determining which 
medical tests and procedures should be: 
 
 - required by law, e.g. vaccinations 
 - publicly funded, but not obligatory, e.g. abortion in progressive states 
 - encouraged, but unsubsidized, e.g. exercise 
 - discouraged, but not banned, e.g. smoking 
 - banned., e.g. heroin 
 
Any assignment of genetic technologies to the categories between obligatory and 
forbidden allows for potential inequality. Most opponents of genetic technology, when 
pressed, would stop short of banning these technologies out-right, and thus leave them to 
be inequitably distributed by the market. At the other extreme, outside of science fiction 
[Wagar, 1989), there are no audible voices calling for a program of mandatory, universal 
genetic redesign. This leaves me with Glover in the usual social democratic, mixed-
market middle: try a little public, and a little private, and we will tinker with it as we 
proceed. 
 
A parallel, and very intriguing, question is whether, when, and by whom genetic 
products may be owned, patented and profited from. Genetically designed animals began 
to be patented in 1987. The U.S. Congress has rejected the patentability of human beings, 
but the Patent Office has accepted the principle that parts of the human genome may be 
patented once their functions have been determined. The Bush administration’s NIH 
attempted to protect future commercial and scientific research by patenting stretches of 
DNA which had been decoded, but whose function had not been identified, raising the 
additional question of what the proper role is for public property in genetics. American 
Human Genome Project scientists have entered into lucrative commercial biotechnology 
ventures, profiting from their publicly-funded research [Fisher, 1994). Again, the social 
democratic muddle is that there must be sufficient protection of genetic products 
encourage innovation, while at the same time there must also be a strong presumption in 
favor of public ownership of genetic code and medical knowledge as the common 
property of humanity. 
 
Fishman’s [Fishman, 1993) article “Patenting Sub-Human Beings...” provides a 
detailed discussion of the current status of animal and human genetic patents in U.S. 
Constitutional law, and the confused future status of intermediate transgenic species. She 
proposes an amendment to the Patent Act defining "human being" as either a being 
possessing one of a number of higher cognitive faculties not yet found in other primates, 
or the progeny of a human mother and human father. I believe the former formula is the 
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direction to go; the current debates over anencephaly and severely disabled newborns 
suggest to me that not all human progeny are, or should be, accorded “humanity,” if 
humanity means a “right to life.” Attempting to determine the cognitive faculties of 
different forms of life, human, non-human and intermediate, and allocating rights 
according to these faculties suggests the possibility of a general decision-rule free of 
(human) racial prejudice. 
 
 
Gene Angst 8 : The Decline of Social Solidarity 
 
Finally some critics suggest that parents would become alienated from their 
genetically engineered children. Dator [Dator, 1989) and other post-humanists suggest 
that genetic engineering and other technologies may create conflict between humans and 
post-humans, and threaten social solidarity. I think this is a serious concern, and one goal 
of the social regulation of genetic technology would be to moderate the rapidity with 
which society genetically advances and diversifies. The gaps between the bodies and 
abilities of parents and children should not be so great as to make parenting impossible. 
Also the  unenhanced public’s concerns will inevitably be a factor in regulating the 
enhancement of the modified minorities. While some of these conservative concerns may 
be warranted, if the enhanced feel they have no responsibility to the unenhanced and seek 
to dominate or exploit them, we must also avoid allowing simple chauvinism and fear of 
the unknown to stop genetic enhancement.  
 
 While tremendous social conflicts can be imagined, they are not that different from 
the conflicts between ethnic minorities and majorities, or between the First World and the 
Third, or between social classes. Like other sources of social division, the relations 
between new genetic communities will hopefully be mediated by the same institutions, 
courts and legislatures, minority rights and majority rule.  The real challenge faced by a 
post-human ethic is to define new parameters for which forms of life should be 
considered property, social wards (neither property nor competent persons, such as 
children), and persons with full citizenship.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 In the midst of a current health care debate, with ethicists and humanists urging us to 
embrace financial and existential limits, and give up the quixotic quest for immortality, 
the post-humanists say “Some alive today may never die.” The potential problems created 
by new medical technology are numerous, and we must work hard to ensure that our 
societies are such that they create more good than harm. But I believe this an achievable 
goal, and that genetic technology offers, if not immortality, such good that the risks are 
dwarfed. Like all speculation (and all utilitarian judgments are based on social 
speculation) this optimism is founded on numerous points of faith. But I find faith in the 
potential unlimited improvability of human nature and expansion of human powers far 
more satisfying than a resignation to our current limits.  
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